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1. Introduction 
 
his paper is a direct extension of the paper of Jones (2007). This author 
presents a simple and tractable Mincerian approach to endogenizing 
schooling time in market economy.  His specification is closest to that 
in Mincer (1958) which does not take into account of social benefits of 
education. Our short note extends his paper on the social returns to accumulation 
of human capital, with particular emphasis on the social returns to education 
which are given by the sum of the private and external marginal benefits of a 
unit of human capital. In other words, we study the problem of human capital 
externalities which comes from social interactions. The theoretical literature 
claims that there are indeed positive educational externalities arising from 
accumulation of human capital. For instance, according to the market 
externalities (Lucas, 1988), a high level of average human capital helps to 
increases the speed of diffusion of knowledge among workers. The main idea 
underlying these externalities is the contrasting private return to education or the 
effect of individual school time on individual income with the social return 
given by the effect of average schooling time on everyone's income. 
  
  
2. The Model 
 
   Following Jones (2007), let the aggregate human capital H the labor in 
efficiency units:     , where   is human capital per worker and   is the 
number of workers. Assume the constant population in a country is distributed 
exponentially by age and faces a constant death rate   > 0: the density is  
           . We suppose that an individual attending school for   years 
T 
obtains human capital       ,  where    is the average human capital externality 
.A recent literature has recognized the existence of such educational positive 
externality. Indeed, a number of authors (Lucas (1988),Rauch (1993), Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2000), Moretti (2003, 2004) have argued that education has large 
and substantial external benefits.  
 
 
   The representative individual ignores the human capital externality and his 
problem is to choose school time    to maximize the expected present discounted 
value of net income: 
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where the base wage      is assumed to grow exponentially at rate   ,   is rate 
of income tax  and      is lump sum transfer. 
 
Solving this maximization problem leads to the extended Mincerian return 
equation: 
 
                             
       
  
       
                                                    (2) 
 
The left side of this equation is the extended standard Mincerian return: the 
percentage increase in the wage if schooling increases by a year. The first order 
condition says that the optimal choice of schooling equates the extended 
Mincerian return to the effective discount rate. In this case, the effective 
discount rate is the interest rate, adjusted for wage growth and the probability of 
death. The original Mincer (1958) specification pinned down the Mincerian 
return by the interest rate. The generalization here shows the additional role 
played by economic growth and limited horizons. Rather than being an 
exogenous parameter, as in the simple version of Bils and Klenow (2000) used 
by Hall and Jones (1999) and others, the Mincerian return in this specification is 
related to fundamental economic variables. 
 
Definition 1 
Let the following constant elasticity functions: 
  
         
  
        
        and       
         
  
        
 
This definition helps to rewrite at equilibrium the extended Mincerian return as 
follows:  
                   
       
  
       
         
 
  
                                     (3)             
Therefore we have the following result. 
 
Proposition 1 (Extended Jones 2007) 
Under decentralized economy, the optimal time for schooling is given by the 
following extended Mincerian Return: 
   
      
         
 
Corollary 1 
The human capital of labor force in efficiency units is:  
    
      
       
 
   
 
 
 
Proof: 
If we assume that               , where    is the schooling time externality 
size , we obtain the announced result by simple substitution. 
Since the agents do not internalize the externality of schooling induced by social 
interactions, in market economy the human capital of labor force is suboptimal. 
Indeed, given the assumptions and constraints facing economic agents ex ante, 
in centralized economy, a benevolent planner recognizes that individuals are 
identical and that their choice will be the same ex post, he is then leads to 
internalize  the schooling time  externality by assuming ex ante that educational 
choice are identical : s = S. Hence, in a centralized economy, the optimal human 
capital of labor force is a solution of the planner’s problem. This planner 
chooses school time s that maximizes the representative agent‘s expected 
present discounted value of income: 
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This program is equivalent to the planner to the following one: 
               
 
 
                                                          (5)                     
                            
This simple problem leads to the following result. 
 
Proposition 2  
Under centralized economy, the optimal time for schooling is given by the 
following extended Mincerian Return: 
   
   
         
 
Proof: 
The standard optimization leads to the equilibrium condition: 
         
        
  
        
    
        
  
        
   
   
  
                                             (6) 
Therefore, from (6) we obtain the announced result: 
   
   
         
 
Corollary 2 
The school time under centralized economy is greater than that chosen under 
market economy, indeed, we have: 
      
    
         
 
Proof 
Under decentralized economy the schooling time is given by     
      
       
  while 
the optimal schooling time is given by     
   
       
 , then we have the 
announced result:          
    
       
. 
We observe that the distortion from the first best is given by the term   
    
       
  which depends on the externality size impact   and the rate of income 
taxation given by   . 
Corollary 3 
The optimal human capital of labor force in efficiency units is:  
    
   
       
 
   
 
Proof:  
Let                   then with   
   
       
, we have the announced 
result. 
Although there is a distortion in educational allocation, this distortion can be 
corrected through a taxation subvention policy. Indeed, if available, an optimal 
policy exists and is given by the following result. 
Proposition 3 
The educational market allocation may be decentralized through a subvention 
taxation scheme given by : 
    
 
 
 
Proof: 
We know that schooling time under centralized economy and that which is 
chosen under market economy are related by the following equation: 
      
    
         
 
Thus we have       if and only if   
    
        
   , therefore: 
for  (           ,we have        which implies        
 
 
. 
 
From this finding, we note that in order to implement an optimal education 
policy in the presence of positive educational externalities, we should subsidize 
the accumulation of human capital, and, the rate of the subsidy depends on the 
relative size of the externality. 
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